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Organizations
Abstract
This paper measures the technological significance of voluntary standard setting
organizations (SSOs) by examining citations to patents disclosed in the standard
setting process. We find that SSO patents are cited far more frequently than a set
of control patents, and that SSO patents receive citations for a much longer period
of time. Furthermore, we find a significant correlation between citation and the
disclosure of a patent to an SSO, which may imply a marginal impact of disclosure.
These results provide the first empirical look at patents disclosed to SSOs, and show
that these organizations not only select important technologies, but may also play
a role in establishing their significance.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the economic and technological impact of voluntary collaborative non-market
standard setting organizations (SSOs). SSOs are an important catalyst for coordination in
many industries where consumers value inter-operability (e.g. telecommunications and com-
puting). These organizations provide a forum for collective decision-making and an alternative
to standardization through market competition or through government regulation. SSOs come
in a variety of shapes and sizes—from large industry associations to small consortia—and are
often involved in a variety of different activities, including collaborative R&D, compatibility
testing, and product certification. SSOs generally do not have formal powers to enforce their
recommendations. As a result, these groups work to create a consensus around particular
technologies that can serve as a focal point for industry coordination or lead to a bandwagon
process among adopters.
Several authors have documented the substantial resources devoted to SSOs and the stan-
dard setting process (Farrell 1996; Cargill, 1997). However, our knowledge of the economic and
technological impact of these institutions remains quite limited. Evaluating the role of SSO’s
is difficult because they operate in diverse markets and their effect on such standard variables
as price and quantity is uncertain. 1 However, a ubiquitous problem for SSO’s is the treatment
of intellectual property. Participants regularly must disclose relevant patents to SSO’s in the
process of negotiating a standard. In this paper, we use these patents as a window into the role
of SSO’s in technological innovation. Patents are easily compared across time and industries,
and many properties are well-known as a result of a large amount of research in economics.
Following the literature on patents in economics, we use patent citations as a measure of
economic and technological innovation (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). We use patents identified
in the intellectual property disclosure records of four SSOs: the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI), the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU). We construct control samples based on technological class and application year of the
patents. In our first set of results, we find that SSO patents receive far more citations than
an average patent, around 3 times higher. More surprisingly, SSO patents receive citations
over a much longer time period. Building on techniques of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001),
we show that the age profile of patent citations is higher for SSO’s than control patents and
1We know of a few empirical studies of standard setting organization in the economics literature, all very
recent. See Chiao, Lerner and Tirole (2005), Gandal, Gantman and Genesove (2005), Toivanen (2004) and Blind
(2005). There is a large, mostly case study literature (for example, Bolin (2004) and the new journal Inter-
national Journal of IT Standards and Standardization Research) that has few members of academic economics
departments, although this is changing (see Greenstein and Stango, 2005).
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that the difference is economically and statistically significant. Interestingly, this difference is
greater when we compare SSO patents to a group of highly cited control patents.
Two reasons that SSO patents differ from other patents are that the SSO selects patents
that represent important technologies and that the SSO actually causes technologies to have
the citation profile we observe. That is, we may wonder whether SSO patents would have had
similar citation patterns if they had never been associated with an SSO. The selection effect is
natural given that SSO’s explicitly attempt to identify the best technology to serve a given need.
Finding that the selection effect is important suggests that SSO are successful in identifying
important technologies. The causal effect may arise because an SSO embeds a technology in a
standard that then exhibits long-lasting economic importance because of network effects and
lock-in. Another source for a causal effect may be that because an SSO disclosure represents
a public announcement, it attracts attention to a patent. Finding a causal effect for SSO’s
suggests that over and above the stated goals of SSO’s in facilitating interconnection between
complementary markets, SSO’s have a further role in determining the path of technological
innovation into the future.
In this paper, we exploit the timing of disclosures to separate between the selection and
causation effects. That is, the extent to which the citation pattern changes after a patent is
disclosed to an SSO gives a measure of the causal effect of the SSO. We are cautious in this
interpretation as the timing of disclosure depends on the economic environment. Below, we
discuss why the endogeneity of disclosure could lead us to over or under-estimate the causation
effect. However, given the lack of a truly exogenous determination of disclosure, we find this
approach a logical starting place.
Our regression approach compares disclosed to undisclosed SSO patents and compares
patents before and after disclosure. We find an economically and statistically significant corre-
lation of citations with disclosure. To the extent that we measure the causal effect of an SSO,
it appears that the causal effect represents between 20% and 26% of the difference in citations
between SSO and non-SSO patents.
This paper contributes to a growing empirical literature that examines the impact of par-
ticular institutions on the process of technological change. Examples of this research include
Furman and Stern’s (2004) study of biological resource centers, and studies of the university-
industry interface, including Mowery et al (1999) and Markiewicz (2004). In the next section,
we describe the four SSOs that are examined in the paper and how they treat intellectual prop-
erty. Section 3 describes the data set, while Section 4 takes an initial look at the difference in
citation patterns between the SSO and control samples. Section 5 examines the post-disclosure
increase in citation rates. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
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2 SSOs and Intellectual Property
Before using patent data to study the role of SSO’s in the innovation process, it is important to
understand the role of patents and intellectual property in the standard setting process. This
section describes the four organizations studied below and describes how each of them deals
with intellectual property.
We use data collected from four major SSO’s. These groups are the European Telecommuni-
cation Standards Institute (ETSI), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE),
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the International Telecommunications Union
- Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T, or often, ITU). Both ETSI and the ITU
are international institutions that focus primarily on telecommunications standards. While
international in scope, the IEEE and IETF draw the majority of their participants from North
America, and are usually associated with the computer hardware and software industries al-
though some of their most significant standards are communications protocols. Table 1 provides
some indication of the relative scope of these four organizations based on the technology class
assigned to each disclosed patent.
Table 1: Technology Classification of SSO Patents†
ETSI IEEE IETF ITU-T Totals
Computers & Communications 532 109 23 62 726
Computers Hardware & Software 94 83 53 59 289
Information Storage 4 7 2 0 13
Electronic Business Methods 0 2 2 0 4
Electrical Devices 7 7 0 1 15
Measuring and Testing 0 2 0 1 3
Power Systems 0 2 0 0 2
Semiconductor Devices 0 9 0 0 9
Misc. Electrical 2 1 0 39 42
Optics 0 1 0 9 10
Total Patents 639 223 80 171 1,113
†Based on subcategory classifications in the NBER US patent database.
Of the four SSOs that we examine, the ITU is the oldest, with origins dating back to around
1865. Its original mission was to promote international coordination among the various rapidly
expanding domestic telephone networks. The ITU is based in Switzerland and is associated
with the United Nations. Its membership consists of delegates from member nations along
with representatives of the larger firms or network operators in each of these countries. The
organization’s standard setting activities continue to emphasize the protocols used to operate
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the international telephone network, with work areas that include numbering and addressing,
network services, physical interconnection, monitoring and accounting, traffic management,
and quality of service.
The IEEE is only slightly younger than the ITU. It was founded in 1884 by several pioneers
in the field of electrical engineering. Although the IEEE is a professional society whose members
are individual engineers, it is possible to become a corporate member when participating in its
standard setting activities. The IEEE’s standard setting efforts cover a wide range of subjects,
from electrical safety, to cryptography, to standards for semiconductor testing equipment. In
recent years, the IEEE’s most commercially significant standards work has revolved around the
802.11 specifications for wireless computer networking.
ETSI was formed in 1988 to provide a less formal and more industry-driven forum than
the ITU for European telecom standardization. The organization is located in southern France
and participants are typically firms—as opposed to the member-state representatives of the
ITU. ETSI has played a prominent role in creating several generations of mobile telephony
standards that are in use throughout Europe and much of the rest of the world. In particular,
it is the forum where a variety of network operators, electronics suppliers, and OEM handset
manufacturers reached key agreements on the GSM and 3G wireless protocols.
Finally, the IETF is the least formal of the four SSOs studied in this paper. This organi-
zation grew out the ARPANET engineering community that emerged during the 1970s, and
did not resemble a formal SSO until the late 1980s or early 1990s (Mowery and Simcoe, 2002).
The IETF creates a host of protocols used to run the internet. Prominent examples include the
internet’s core transport protocols (TCP/IP and Ethernet), standards used to allocate network
addresses (DHCP), and specifications used by popular applications such as e-mail or file trans-
fer. From its inception, membership in the IETF and its various working groups has been open
to any interested individual. Much of the IETF’s work takes place in online forums sponsored
by individual committees and is visible to the general public.
Because all four of the SSOs examined in this paper are more or less “open” each of them
must deal with the increasing tension between open standards and intellectual property pro-
tection. The goal of most SSOs is to promote widespread implementation and adoption of
the specifications they produce. However, these goals often conflict with those of individual
participants who may hold intellectual property rights in a proposed standard. Patent owners
frequently seek royalty payments for the use of their technology—even (or, perhaps, especially)
when it is essential to the implementation of an industry standard. Moreover, many firms re-
alize that owning intellectual property rights in an industry standard can result in substantial
licensing revenues. This creates strong incentives to push for one’s own technology within the
SSO, and may lead to long-delays or breakdowns in the standard setting process (Simcoe 2004).
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While most SSOs would like to avoid the distributional conflicts and obstacles to imple-
mentation that patents can produce, they often have no choice other than to evaluate a variety
of proposals that are subject to some type of intellectual property protection. In part, this
is because of the well-documented surge in patenting that began in the mid-1980s. This in-
crease reflects a growing awareness of patents’ strategic significance, as well as the actions of
courts, policy-makers, and patent offices. Awareness of the tension between SSOs and their
patent-holding members has also increased because of a number of high-profile legal conflicts. 2
Given the increasing importance of the intellectual property issue, many SSOs have been
debating their own policies for dealing with patents. Lemley (2002) presents a survey of the
various policies that SSOs have adopted. All four of the SSOs examined in this paper use
variations on the relatively common policy of “reasonable and non-discriminatory” licensing
(RAND). Under this policy, SSO members agree to disclose any known property rights as soon
as they become aware of them. (They are not, however, obliged to carry out a search.) When
a patent or other piece of intellectual property is discovered, the SSO seeks assurances from
the owner that they will license the technology to any interested standards implementor on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.3 While SSO’s and their individual committees are
generally inclined to search for technologies that are unprotected or available on a royalty-free
basis, their job is to evaluate the potential tradeoff between technical quality and openness.4
Figure 1 illustrates the growth in intellectual property disclosures at the four SSOs that
we study. (We define a disclosure is an announcement by a single firm on a given date that it
potentially owns one or more pieces of intellectual property.) While the number of intellectual
property disclosures was initially quite small, it began to grow during the early 1990’s. By the
late 1990s, all four SSOs were experiencing significant growth.
For our purposes, the rise in intellectual property disclosures means that we have access to
a publicly available list of patents associated with standard setting. Many features of patents,
2The most well-known is the Rambus case. The documents for the case can be found at the FTC web site
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/
3In practice, the “reasonable and non-discriminatory” requirement in a RAND licensing policy seems to imply
very few obligations on the part of prospective licensors. The reasonableness requirement is rarely taken to mean
that the technology must be offered at a uniform price. When the intellectual-property holder has not made an ex
ante commitment to some set of licensing terms, each potential implementor of the standards will negotiate their
own terms. While licensors are expected to negotiate in good faith with any potential developer, the individual
terms offered may vary widely. SSOs have been very hesitant to get further involved in the negotiating process.
In part this reflects their own concerns about the antitrust implications associated with any type of collective
pricing agreement. At the same time, it also likely reflects their fear of alienating particular members.
4Each of the SSOs considered below uses some variation on a RAND IPR policy. All of them have produced
specifications that contain proprietary technology at some point. The IETF’s policy is the least centralized, in
that it leaves most of the decision-making to the discretion of its individual working groups. IEEE follows the
guidelines established by ANSI. ETSI’s policy is the most explicit of the four. In particular, it specifies a set of
rules for dealing with a situation where some intellectual property is determined to be essential to a standards
development effort.
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Figure 1: Intellectual Property Disclosures
such as the number of citations they receive, are easily compared across different industries
and time periods. We utilize the information contained in intellectual property disclosures to
identify standards-related patents whose citation rates may provide a window onto the potential
impact of SSOs.
A note of caution: patents may be disclosed for proposals that never become standards, and
proposals may become standards but not require licensing of every patent that was disclosed
in relation to the proposal. We observe only intellectual property disclosures, not whether they
were included in the final standard, whether the proposal became a standard or often even
what proposal they were disclosed in relation to. Making these distinctions might be useful for
a number of questions and such data are the subject of current search.
3 Data
This section describes the sample of SSO patents that we use to study the standard setting
process. All of these data were collected from the publicly available records of ETSI, the IEEE,
IETF, and ITU. We begin by describing the complete sample of intellectual property disclosures.
We then examine the 1,113 US patents contained in one or more of these disclosures. After
discussing some of the issues associated with these patents, we conclude by describing the
creation of our initial control sample.
Although the four SSOs in this study have similar intellectual property policies, the scope
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and specificity of individual disclosures varies dramatically across organizations. These differ-
ences reflect variation in the participants, policies, and objectives of the four institutions. In
order to provide some intuition for the type of disclosure information provided by these SSOs,
we group the data using a particular definition of “disclosure.” We define a disclosure as an
announcement by a single firm on a given date that it owns (or may own) one or more pieces
of intellectual property related to a single standard setting initiative. When a firm claims that
a single patent covers two or more standards, each one counts as a separate disclosure. When
a single announcement lists more than one patent or patent application, we will refer to each
piece of intellectual property in the disclosure as a claim. (Since we do not work with the claims
data from individual patents, this should not lead to much confusion.)
Table 2: Intellectual Property Disclosures
Disclosures Claims per Disclosure Patents
Earliest Total (Count) Mean Median Max All Patents US Patents
ETSI April, 1990 262 36.5 4 1582 847 672
IEEE January, 1988 125 3.4 1 37 313 252
IETF June, 1995 314 1.5 1 27 193 97
ITU-T October, 1983 821 1.0 1 2 339 188
Table 2 illustrates some of the variation in how intellectual property is disclosed across the
four SSOs in this study. First, the data for each organization begins at a different point in
time. While the ITU disclosures begin in 1983, intellectual property did not become an issue
at the IETF until 1995. Second, there are substantial differences in the number of claims per
disclosure. While the ITU has the largest number of disclosures, almost all of them contain
a single claim. At ETSI, on the other hand, the median disclosure makes four claims, and
one contains more than 1500. Finally, individual claims vary in their level of specificity. For
example, it was a common practice at the IETF for several years to “disclose” the existence
of an unpublished patent application without providing any information that could be used to
verify its existence. This variation in claim-specificity can be seen by comparing the number
of patents disclosed to the total number of claims at an SSO. Figure 2 shows the percentage of
disclosures that list one or more US patent numbers at each SSO.
The final column in Table 2 shows the number of US patents contained in the data set. This
figure is smaller than the number of patents claimed at each SSOs for two reasons. First, many
disclosures list non-US patents. This is particularly true at ETSI, where the large number
of claims per disclosure often reflects the disclosure of patent families which cover the same
invention in several legal jurisdictions. Second, there are several patents that get disclosed more
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Figure 2: Disclosures Listing US Patents
than once (both within and between SSO’s). For example, there are a number of cryptography
patents that seem to be disclosed on a regular basis when SSOs deal with issues of computer
security.
After removing all of the foreign patents, patent applications, and duplicate observations,
the intellectual property disclosures made at ETSI, the IEEE, IETF and ITU yield a sample of
1,113 unique US patents. We do not claim that these patents are broadly representative of the
technology evaluated by these four SSOs. More likely, they are concentrated within several of
the most commercially significant standard setting efforts. Nevertheless, these patents provide
a unique opportunity to study the role of SSOs in the innovation process.
We obtained citation data for these patents by linking the SSO sample to the NBER US
patent data file (Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg 2001).5 These data also contains several important
patent characteristics, such as application and grant dates, and the name of assignees. Figure
3 shows the distribution of grant dates for the patents in the SSO sample.
It is clear from Figure 3 that the majority of patents listed in SSO disclosures were not
granted by the USPTO until the mid-1990s. This is not surprising, given the surge in patenting
and the timing of the disclosures in Figure 1. However, because these are relatively new patents,
it is important to consider the issue of sample truncation. In particular, many of the SSO
patents were granted near the end of our sample (our citation data extends to 2004). While
5These data have been updated through 2002 and are available on Bronwyn Hall’s web site
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/bhdata.html
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Figure 3: Grant Dates of SSO Patents
we would like to study the long run impacts of SSO affiliation, the data are not sufficient to
consider what happens to SSO patents after about 15 years. This issue becomes even more
severe when we focus on comparing the pre- and post-disclosure periods—which in many cases
may only last one or two years.
Throughout the analysis, we will be comparing the SSO patents to a control sample. The
baseline control sample was chosen by selecting all of the patents with the same application
year and primary 3-digit technology classification as any patent disclosed to one of the four
SSOs.
Before turning to the analysis, it is important to consider how we should interpret the
citation patterns revealed below. There are a number of papers that suggest that forward-
citations (i.e. the citations received by a particular patent after it has been granted) are an
indicator of economic and technological significance. For example, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(2005) show that citation weighted patent counts are more correlated with a firm’s market value
than un-weighted patent counts. Other papers, such as Jaffe, Henderson and Trajtenberg (1993)
interpret these citations as an indicator of knowledge flows from the cited to the citing entity.6
For this paper, it is not important to defend any particular interpretation of the meaning of
a patent citation. As long as forward citation counts contain some information about the
6This interpretation raises the question of how to treat self-citations (i.e. citations to a patent owned by the
same entity as the citing patent). We found that there was little difference in the results presented below when
self-cites were excluded from the sample. For now, we have removed them just to be conservative.
10
technological or commercial significance of the cited invention, we can use them to learn about
the impact of SSOs on the innovation process.
4 Citation Patterns
In this section, we examine the distribution of forward-citations to patents in the SSO and
control samples. We are primarily interested in the age profile of citations – the average citation
rate conditional on patent age. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) refer to this statistic as the
lag distribution. (Caballero, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg—hereafter CHJT—have written a
series of papers that examine the shape of this distribution for various sets of patents. See
Hall and Trajtenberg, 2002) We begin with a direct comparison of the average citation rates
for SSO and control patents. We then turn to an econometric model with application-year and
citing-year fixed effects to account for time trends in citing propensity and differences in the
“fertility” of inventions across vintage years.
Figure 4 provides a direct comparison of the age profile of citations that illustrate the two
basic results that emerge from this section. First, SSO patents are cited more frequently than
controls. This holds true regardless of which organization we look at. The average number of
citations collected by SSO patents ranges from 26 at the ITU to 37 at the IETF. This compares
with the control groups which all average between 7 and 9 citations. Second, the age profile
of the SSO patent citations is different from that of the controls. In particular, SSO’s patents
exhibit a later peak in citations and a longer lived citation life. This is true overall and for
each SSO individually.
One of the most striking facts about Figure 4 is the particularly long citation life exhibited
at the IETF. A quick search reveals that there are several notable patents appearing in the tail
of the age profile for the IETF, as well as the IEEE. These patents include numbers 4,405,829
and 4,200,770, which cover the basics of public-key cryptography, as well as 4,063,220 which
describes the Ethernet networking.7 These are exceptional patents in many respects—including
the fact that they are disclosed on separate occasions in more than one SSO. So, while these
patents are excellent examples of the potential impact of an SSO on the innovation process, it
is hard to believe that the average patent from among the 400 disclosed at these SSOs in 2003
will turn out to have a similar citation trajectory. Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider
whether the importance of the inventions embodied in these early patents could have enhanced
the future influence of their respective SSOs.
7The inventors on the first patent are Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adelman, whose initials are
the basis for RSA crypotography. The second patent’s inventors include Martin Hellman and Bailey Diffie. The
third patent’s inventor was Robert Metcalfe, who created Ethernet while working at Xerox PARC
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Figure 4: Citation Flows for Individual SSO’s
While these figures turn out to be consistent with the results found below, it is important
to be careful about drawing any conclusions based on the unconditional age profile. The data
contains far more information about the first few years of the age profile than the later ones.
The sharp increase in citation rates for later years may be caused by a combination of sample
truncation and a small number of extremely significant SSO patents. Moreover, these figures do
not make any adjustment for differences in the application-year or citing-year. In order to deal
with some of the problems inherent in the simple comparisons of 4, we turn to an econometric
model of the citation process. This approach corrects for a number of confounding factors, such
as the increase in average citation rates over time or differences in the technological significance
or “fertility” associated with different application-year cohorts.
Separately identifying the age profile of citations from application-year and citing-year
effects can be problematic. Following CJHT, it is important to control for the application
year of the citing and cited patent as the application year captures economically relevant
time features. Further, CJHT define age as the difference between application year and the
citing year. Therefore, the three variables are perfectly collinear and their separate effects
cannot be identified without parametric restrictions. In order to proceed, CJHT make non-
linear functional form restrictions on how the application year, the citing year and age affect
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citations. Identifying age effects separately from cohort and time effects is a common empirical
problem in economics. Hall, Mairesse and Turner (2005) review a number contexts in which
it arises and review standard solutions. These solutions consist of different ways to restrict
functional forms.
As an alternative, we follow an approach proposed in Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe (2005).
Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe (2005) points out that the process of diffusion and obsolescence
that is captured by the age process described in CJHT can be reasonably thought to start with
the publication of the patent instead of the application of the patent. Under this view, we
define age as the difference between the citing year (as measured by the application year of
the citing patent) and the grant year of the cited patent. This approach exploits the time to
grant as random exogenous noise to separately identify age effects from cohort and time effects.
Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe consider the efficacy of this approach. They find support for it
in the data and find that it results in similar conclusions to CJHT. 8 Intuitively, we compare
across patents with the same application year to see how many citations they receive in a given
citing year. Differences in the time to grant among the cited patents allows us to identify the
effect of age. We adopt the approach here because it allows for non-parametric identification
of the levels of citations of both SSO and control patents.
It is natural under this definition for patents to receive citations at negative ages. That
occurs whenever a patent is a cited by a patent that applies before the cited patent is granted.
For our assumption that age begins at grant date to be exactly correct, it must be that these
citations are added by the patent examiner or turned up in a patent search as opposed to
indicating an actual intellectual debt. Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe (2005) discuss this at
length. In practice, we drop citations from ages below -2 from our data set.
We consider the following specification, where Cit is the number of citations received by
patent i in year t, αy are fixed effects for application year y, αt are fixed effects for citing year t
(as measured by the application year of the citing patent), αCTRLa and α
SSO
a are the age effects
for the control patents and SSO patents at age a, and εit is a patent-year error term that is
uncorrelated with the fixed effects.
Cit = f(αy, αt, αCTRLa , α
SSO
a , εit) (1)
In practice, the function f() is typically a poisson function, which generates count variables
such as what we observe in our data. This specification is based on the assumption that the
8In particular, Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe (2005) show that patents with longer time-to-grant reach their
peak in citations later (relative to application date). In addition, the distribution of citations around the grant
date appears very similar for patents with differences in time-to-grant.
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application-year and citing-year effects are identical for the SSO and control sample but that the
age profiles can be different. This is a natural assumption as application-year and citing-year
effects are meant to capture “macro” effects, such as changes in policy at the USPTO. While
both the control sample and the SSO sample contribute to identifying the application-year and
citing-year effects, the number of observations in the control sample dwarfs the number in the
SSO sample. Conceptually, we are using the control sample to pin down application-year and
citing-year effects and we are estimating age effects for each sample separately.
Note that if we defined age as a = t− y, no function of age would be separately identified
from y and t dummies regardless of how few parameters we use. But this definition of age is
the standard approach. We have also run specifications where we defined age as a = t− y and
dropped αCTRLa from the specification. In this sense, αy and αt can be thought of as controlling
for application-year, citing-year and age effects of the control sample and αSSOa identifies the
difference in age effects between the SSO and control samples. To the extent that results are
comparable, we find similar results to those below. But we are interested in comparing the
SSO and control sample, not just in identifying their difference. Defining a = t− g where g is
the grant year allows us to do so (in addition to being sensible).
We estimate Equation 1 as a poisson regression for each SSO separately. 9 We leave a full
set of regression results unreported. The most obvious result from these regressions is that the
SSO age dummies are larger than the control dummies, generally implying that SSO patents
receive around 3 times as many citations. This result is not surprising based on Figure 4, which
reflects the fact that most patents receive very few citations. While the difference is striking,
other hypothesis are difficult to evaluate directly from parameter estimates. Instead, we focus
some summary statistics.
More interesting than the level of citation differences is that SSO patents receive citations
over a longer time period than control patents. It is straightforward to use the regression
results to generate a predicted number of citations for each age (we set the dummy variables
for application year 1999 and citation year 1999 on and leave the other application and citation
years off). We use these results to compute the probability distribution function of citations
over age for the control and SSO patents. Then, we can compute the average age of a citation
to each group of patents.
Table 3 presents these results for each SSO, both in the raw data and based on our estimation
results. The estimation procedure corrects for the truncation problem inherent in observing
many patents near the end of the sample period and so the average age is naturally higher in
9One patent disclosed to the IETF has an application year of 1977 while all the rest are applied for in 1985
or later. We drop the 1977 patent in the following analysis.
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the regression results than in the raw data. The important point to see is that the average age
of a citation is greater for SSO patents than control patents. The difference is positive and
significant for each SSO in both the raw and regression results. Note that we have measured
age as age since grant.
Control SSO Control SSO Difference
IETF 1.348 3.299 3.752 5.361 1.609
(0.006) (0.064) (0.107) (0.126) (0.166)
IEEE 2.021 5.066 3.498 4.617 1.119
(0.005) (0.067) (0.082) (0.101) (0.130)
                 
ITU 2.556 4.250 3.420 4.133 0.713
(0.005) (0.054) (0.076) (0.086) (0.115)
ETSI 2.058 3.263 4.106 5.263 1.157
(0.004) (0.023) (0.061) (0.063) (0.088)
Raw From Regression Results
Table 3: Average age since grant of citations
Figure 5 graphs the distributions as computed from the regression results. The distributions
are for ages -2 to 12. In each case, we can see that the SSO distribution is lower at low ages
and higher at high ages. The IETF exhibits the most remarkably long-lived citation profile.
CJHT draw similar graphs for a number of groups of patents and always find peaks in the
4th or 5th year after the application year. That is consistent with our control groups, which
show peaks 1 to 2 years after the grant year. This result contrasts with the SSO patents, which
exhibit later peaks. For instance, the peak in the ETSI distribution occurs 7 years after the
grant date. We know of no other group of patents for which the peak in citation rates are so
late.
One concern may be that the high average age of a citation in the SSO sample stems from
the fact that SSO patents represent important technologies. That is, it might be true that all
highly cited patents exhibit age profiles like we see for SSO patents. In fact, the opposite is
true. We show that highly cited patents have age profiles shifted towards lower ages relative
to the average patent, not towards higher ages.
To show this, we break up the control patents into average patents and highly cited patents,
where highly cited patents collect greater than some cut-off number of citations over their
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Figure 5: Age profile of citations based on regression results
lifetime. 10 We re-run the poisson regression above but now we allow for separate age dummies
for average and highly cited patents. In Table 4, we report the resulting average age of citations
for the highly cited and SSO patents. Again, SSO patents have later average ages than control
patents, both in the raw data and in the predictions from regression results.
Comparing across Tables 3 and 4, we see that the regression results predict that highly
cited patents have a lower average citation age than the full set of control patents. This result
is true for the set of controls associated with each SSO. We believe this is because the plurality
of patents get no citations, which implies a flat age profile. It is the patents that actually
get citations that generate the hump-shaped age profile. Removing the patents that get no
citations from the sample exaggerates the hump-shaped profile. In the raw results, the highly
cited control patents have a higher average age than the full set of control patents. This differs
from the regression results because picking patents with a high number of absolute cites selects
for patents with early application dates that get cites over a long period of time. The regression
procedure corrects for this truncation issue. We have also performed these experiments defining
“highly cited” patents to be those with total citations in the highest decile of citations for each
10The cut-offs were chosen so that the highly cited patents had slightly higher average citation rates than the
SSO patents. The cut-offs were 20 for the IETF, 11 for the IEEE and the ITU and 14 for ETSI.
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application year (which implies less truncation effects) and found very similar results. Note
that the average age predicted by the regressions for the SSO patents changes somewhat across
Tables 3 and 4 because the application and citing-year effects change. The result for SSO’s in
the raw data naturally does not change.
Control SSO Control SSO Difference
IETF 1.911 3.299 2.842 4.418 1.577
(0.009) (0.064) (0.222) (0.124) (0.255)
                
IEEE 2.367 5.066 3.300 4.527 1.226
(0.006) (0.067) (0.178) (0.099) (0.204)
                 
ITU 2.952 4.250 3.208 4.031 0.823
(0.006) (0.054) (0.165) (0.083) (0.185)
ETSI 2.596 3.263 3.221 4.900 1.679
(0.005) (0.023) (0.143) (0.061) (0.155)
Raw From Regression Results
Table 4: Average age since grant of citations for highly cited control patents
5 Selection versus Causation
The previous section showed that patents disclosed to SSOs are cited at higher rates than the
average patent. We interpret this as evidence that these patents embody significant inventions.
However, this evidence is insufficient to distinguish whether SSOs select technologies that would
have been important regardless or whether SSOs actually influence on the importance of these
technologies. In this section, we use the timing of intellectual property disclosures to distinguish
these affects. Our goal is to use the disclosure event to estimate the marginal impact of the
standard setting organization on patent citation rates.
To be clear, this interpretation depends on the date of disclosure being an exogenous event.
This condition is unlikely to be met in practice and the sign of the associated bias is difficult to
predict. Suppose the selection effect dominates and patent holders tend to disclose important
patents to SSO’s, but they do not realize the importance of patents for some number of years.
Then, they may choose to disclose patents at the time they can predict that citations will
increase. In that case, we will observe an increase in citations around the date of disclosure
but presumably, the patent would have experienced the increase without disclosure and the
correlation between citations and disclosure would over-estimate the marginal impact. Con-
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versely, suppose there is a large causal effect of disclosure but market participants can predict
which patents will be disclosed some period in advance. In that case, patents may begin to
receive citations before disclosure, which would cause the correlation between disclosure and
citations to understate the impact of SSO disclosure on citations. With these concerns in
mind, we interpret the correlation between disclosure and citations with caution. But as we
lack truly exogenous events pushing patents into SSO negotiations, this approach seems to be
the appropriate starting place for distinguishing between the selection and causation effects.
We estimate the impact of disclosure in two ways. In the first approach, we are interested
in comparing the size of the SSO effect to the size of the disclosure effect. That is, we want to
measure the extra effect on an SSO patent of being disclosed. We use the following regression
framework:
Cit = f(αy, αt, αa, αSSO, αDiscit εit) (2)
In this equation, αa represents age dummies, αSSO represents a dummy for an SSO patent and
αDiscit is a dummy for patent i having been disclosed by period t. In this regression, α
Disc
it is
estimated entirely off of within-SSO variation. For instance, if all SSO patents were disclosed in
the same year or at the same age, αDiscit would not be identified. Note that we assume the age
process is the same for SSO and control patents and capture the SSO effect in a single dummy.
Doing so makes the size of the SSO effect easily comparable to the size of the disclosure effect.
Results for the disclosure dummy are very similar if we allow for a set of SSO age dummies.
Throughout this paper, we have used a control group of patents to identify application
and citing-year effects under the assumption that are supposed to capture “macro” issues that
affect SSO and control patents equally. Doing so is not necessary for results in which we do
not want to compare to a control group. In our second approach, we estimate Equation 2
using SSO patents only, dropping the parameter αSSO which is no longer necessary. Therefore,
application-year effects, citation-year effects, the age profile and of course the disclosure effect
are identified purely from SSO data.
One issue we face is that disclosure is a relatively recent phenomenon. Figure 1 shows that
there were almost no disclosures before 1988. Patents granted well before this time presumably
faced a different process than ones that came later. To fix ideas, compare the cohort of patents
applied for in 2000 to that applied for in 1990 and consider which members of these two groups
are disclosed to the IETF, which receives its first disclosure in 1995. Suppose 10 patents from
the 2000 group are disclosed. Even if 10 patents from 1990 have the potential to be disclosed
to the IETF, most of them are discarded by the time disclosure becomes a normal action. We
can imagine that only 1 or 2 from the 1990 group would be disclosed, and those would be the
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ones that were very established and received many citations before disclosure. Because SSO
patents that were granted before disclosure was an option tend to collect many citations before
disclosure, these patents lead to a low estimate of the disclosure parameter.
In order to eliminate this problem, we drop patents with application years before disclosure
to a given SSO was a reasonable event. The optimal cut-off year would be the one in which
norms guiding disclosure stop changing, although arguably these norms are still changing today.
Choosing earlier dates provides a conservative estimate of the disclosure effect. For the IEEE
and the ITU we keep patents with application years in 1989 or later. For the IETF, we use
1994 and for ETSI, we use 1995. For the IETF and ETSI, these are the first years in which
we observe disclosure. In general, making these cut-offs earlier leads to lower (and possibly
insignificant) estimates of the disclosure parameter and making them later leads to a higher
parameter. The counter-example is ETSI. In fact, only 3 patents were disclosed in 1995 and
after that, no patents were disclosed until 2000. We interpret the ETSI results with caution
given the short post-disclosure data that we have.
Table 5 presents results. We leave application-year, citing-year and age parameters un-
reported. The first column of each panel presents the results using the control sample. Not
surprisingly, the SSO dummy is positive and precisely estimated for all four SSO’s. In addi-
tion, the disclosure dummy is positive and significant as well for all but ETSI. For the IETF,
IEEE and ITU, the disclosure parameter ranges between 25% and 35% of the SSO dummy. If
we interpret the dummy on disclosure as representing the marginal impact of the SSO on the
citation count, we can say that between 20% and 26% of the high citations counts for SSO
patents are due to being disclosed to an SSO, and the rest is a selection effect. This result
strikes us as very reasonable, although we do not have strong priors over this statistic.
SSO only SSO only SSO only SSO only
SSO 0.937 0.841 0.843 0.685
(0.028) (0.017) (0.026) (0.015)
Disclosure 0.284 0.475 0.215 0.150 0.297 0.205 0.082 0.291
(0.062) (0.075) (0.035) (0.043) (0.035) (0.043) (0.046) (0.061)
obs. 142175 499 400858 1915 415165 1455 301050 2934
cut-off year
Notes: A poisson regression of citations in a year on application year and citation year dummies, and a single set of age dummies,
as well as dummies for SSO patents and for periods in or after disclosure to the SSO. Column II of each panel uses only SSO paten
Regressions use only patents with application years in or after the cut-off year, chosen for when disclosures appear at that SSO.
1995
ETSIIETF IEEE ITU
1994 1989 1989
Table 5: Average age of citations for highly cited control patents
The second column of each panel uses only SSO data to estimate the disclosure effect. In
this case, the parameter is significant for all four SSO’s, although note that the parameter for
19
ETSI would be insignificant if we excluded the 3 patents disclosed in 1995. The magnitudes
are similar to the case with the control sample, except for the IETF which is about twice the
size. Differences are due to the different application, citing and age effects, but the similarity
in coefficients suggests that the application and citing-year processes appear to be similar in
the SSO and control samples. Visual inspection of the parameter estimates (not reported) also
suggest they are similar.
These results suggest an economically significant disclosure effect. In addition, we find
similar results if we define disclosure to occur one year after the reported disclosure year in
order to account for some sort of lag. However, it would be interesting to do more complex
analysis. For instance, we might be interested in how citations vary in the years just before and
after disclosure, or how age profiles change when we control for disclosure. We are limited in our
ability to answer these questions because of the scarcity of data when using only within-SSO
variation. For these purposes, we are currently exploring the use a control sample comparison.
While the process of matching patents to a control sample brings up well-known problems
with unobserved heterogeneity, the larger sample size allows us to pose new and interesting
questions.
An alternative approach would be to consider using patent fixed effects. That is, instead of
making within-SSO comparisons, we could make comparison purely within patents. As pointed
out in Hall, Mairesse and Turner (2005), patent fixed effects (which capture application year)
would be collinear with the combination of age and citing year effects. In this case, the technique
of Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe (2005) would not be sufficient to obtain separate identification
because the patent fixed effects would control for the time-to-grant as well as the application
year. One could estimate just patent fixed effects and age effects, but keeping in mind that
these variables are collinear with citing-year effects means the “age effects” would be difficult to
interpret as such. Therefore, using patent fixed effects would not be desirable in for identifying
age profiles as above. However, one could estimate in this fashion and still estimate a disclosure
effect, which would be identified and interpreted as we have done so far. Such an approach is
the subject of current research.
6 Conclusions
While the importance of SSOs has been widely remarked by academics and practitioners,
there have been few attempts to systematically measure their role in economic performance
or technological change. Moreover, since much of the evidence for SSOs’ importance is based
on specific examples of technologies they have endorsed, there continues to be some debate
over whether they actually influence the process of cumulative development or merely choose
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to select and evaluate important technologies. This is the first paper to address these issues
using patent citations as a measure of SSO performance.
Using data from the patents disclosed in the standard setting process at ETSI, IEEE, IETF,
and the ITU, we showed show that the SSO patents collect many more citations, typically
around 3 times as many. Furthermore, they have a different age profile of citations, receiving
them over a longer time span. Finally, we exploited the timing of SSO patent disclosures to
show that there is a correlation between citations and the act of disclosure, representing more
than 20% of the total difference between SSO and non-SSO patents.
Subject to concerns about the exogeneity of the disclosure event, the large selection ef-
fect suggests that SSOs are successful in identifying important technologies. Furthermore, the
significant causal effect suggests that current SSO decisions impact the path of future tech-
nological innovation. This may occur because SSOs embed technologies in standards that are
difficult to switch away from because of network effects. Alternatively, it may be simply the
attention attracted to a technology by a disclosure, possibly due to the disclosure’s indication
that a patent-holder is willing to license its technology.
The treatment of intellectual property at SSOs is a subject of interest to many in the
technology policy-making community, and a number of recent events have increased the promi-
nence of this issue. These events include the Rambus case, the surge in intellectual property
disclosures at SSOs, the W3C’s decision to adopt a royalty-free licensing policy, and the Stan-
dards Development Organization Act of 2004—which extended certain antitrust protections
originally contained in the National Cooperative R&D Act to American SSOs. While this
paper emphasizes the positive question of SSOs’ role in technological change, the finding that
these institutions not only select important technologies but also may influence their future
significance suggests that the policy interest in these issues are justified. While we hope to
address a number of these questions in future research, we should acknowledge that it is hard
to draw any clear welfare implications from the current results. In particular, the impact of
having patents in an industry standard will depend on the rules of the SSO, participants’ will-
ingness to license any essential intellectual property, and whether they do so on “reasonable
and non-discriminatory” terms.
Nevertheless, this paper provides some of the first large-sample statistical evidence related
to the patents disclosed in the standard setting process, and should be an important starting
point for future research. We will conclude by suggesting a number of possible extensions
to this research. First, while several studies have tied patent citations to various measures
of economic or technological significance, it would be valuable to examine whether patents
disclosed to SSOs are also linked to variables such as a firm’s market value. This work would
involve collecting additional data on SSO patents that provides some indication of whether a
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disclosed patent was part of an important standard and/or was determined to be essential to
the implementation of that specification. This data would also provide a means for identifying
the underlying causes behind the SSO effects. In particular, we might be concerned that the
marginal impact of an SSO on future citation flows is actually just a “publicity effect,” caused
by the announcement that the patent is tied to a particular technology. If essential patents
connected to important standards receive a larger post-disclosure boost, we should conclude
that the citation increase actually reflects the network effects associated with standardization.
Another interesting direction is to explore the relationship between patents disclosed to SSOs
and other groups of “significant” patents, such as the general purpose technologies identified
by Hall and Trajtenberg (2004).
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